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350 DORSEY v. BARBA [38 C.2d 
[So F. No. 18369. In Bank. Feb. 4, 1952.] 
,TOSEPIH~E DORSEY et at, AppellJlnts, V. VINCENT 
BARBA et at, Respondents. 
(1] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Owner.-In the absence of com-
pliance with Veh. Code, §§ 178, 186, relating to endorsement 
of certificate of ownership and to notice of transfer, a pur-
ported transfer of an automobile is ineffective to relieve an 
owner of the liability imposed under Veh. Code, § 402, re- I 
lating to liability for negligence of a person operating the 
vehicle with the owner's express or implied permission. 
[2] Id.-Persons Liable-Owner.-A person may be liable as an 
owner under Veh. Code, § 402, for negligence of another op-
erating an automobile with his permission, even though he 
does not have "all the incidents of ownership" as the term 
"owner" is defined in Veh. Code, § 66, since the express men-
tion of such exceptions as conditional vendors and chattel 
mortgagees from the operation of § 402 indicates that the 
framers thereof did not intend to incorporate the definition 
of owner found in § 66. . 
[3] Id.-Persons Liable-Wife.-A wife, who is the sole registered 
owner of an automobile, is included in the term "every owner" 
as used in Veh. Code, § 402, and where she is not within 
any of the exceptions mentioned in such section she can avoid 
liability for her husband's negligence in operating the car 
only by showing that she did not actually consent or had 
no power to cousent to his use of the car. 
[4] Id.-Persons Liable-Wife.-Where an automobile is registered 
in the wife's name alone and she in fact consents to her 
husband's use and operation of it, she cannot avoid liability 
for her husband's negligence under Veh. Code, § 402, by claim-
ing that she is without power· to give such consent and that 
she has merely a community property interest in the car. 
[6] Id.-BegistratioD.-The requirements fol' registration of motor 
vehicles (Veh. Code, § 140 et seq.) were "enacted in the in-
terests of the public welfare, and one of the purposes for 
the legislation is to afford identification of vehicles and per-
sons responsible in eases of accident and injury. 
[IJ See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Automobiles, § 302; Am.Jur., 
Automobiles, § 356. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1,2J Automobiles, § 167(1); [3,4] 
Automobiles, § 165; [5] Automobiles, § 20; [6,7,10] Jury, § 5; 
[8J Damages, ~ 197: [9] .Jury, § 8: [11] Jury, § 8(4); [12,13] Dam-
ages, § 197; [14] New Trial, § 244. 
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[6] Jury-Right to Jury Trial.--Const., art. I, § 7, guarantees the 
right of a jury trial as it existed at common law when the 
Constitution was adopted in 1849. 
[7] Id.-Right to Jury Trial.-The constitutional guarantee of 
l·ight to jury trial does not require adherence to the letter 
of common law practice, and new procedures better suited 
to the efficient administration of justice may be substituted 
if there is no impairment of the substantial features of a 
jury trial. 
[8] Damages-Province of Court and Jury.-An essential element 
of a jury trial is that issues of fact shall be decided by a 
jury, including the assessment of damages, and any inter-
ference with the jury's function in this respect must be 
examined with the utmost care. 
[9] Jury-Right to Jury Trial-Denial of Right.-A court may 
not increase an inadequate award in a case involving con-
te!ted damages without the consent of plaintiff; such act 
constitutes a denial of his right to a jury trial in violation 
of Const., art I, § 7. 
[10] Id.-Right to Jury Trial.-It is not the mere form of a jury 
trial to which one is entitled under the Constitution, but the 
fundamental right to have a jury determination of a question 
of fact. 
[11] Id.-Right to Jury Trial-Denial of Right.-There has been 
no denial of the right to a jury trial if a verdict is set aside 
and motion for new trial granted. 
[12] Damages-Province of Court and Jury.-The court may not, 
in lieu of ordering a new trial following the verdict of a 
jury, itself assess damages on conflicting or uncertain evidence 
and modify the judgment with the assent of only one party; 
nor can such procedure be justified as a proper exercise of 
the court's authority to prescribe terms in granting or deny-
ing motions for new trials. 
[13] Id.-Province of Court and Jury.-A court may not impose 
conditions which impair the right of either party to a re-
assessment of damages by the jury where the first verdict 
was inadequate, and defendant's waiver of his right to jury 
trial by consenting to modification of the judgment cannot 
be treated as binding on plaintiff. 
[14] New Trial-Conditional Orders-Remission of Damages.-
A court has power to require reduction of a jury's award 
over defendant's objection as a condition to denying his 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Jury, § 3; Am.Jur., Jury, §4. 
[9] Power of court to reduce or increase verdict without giving 
party affected the option to submit to a new trial, notes, 58 
A.L.R. 779; 95 A.L.R. 1163. 
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motion for a new trial in cases where damages are uncer-
tain and speculative. 
APPEAL from judgments of the Superior' Court of Ala-
meda County. Donald K. Quayle, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in au 
automobile accident. Judgment for defendant Catherine 
Barba and against defendant Vincent Barba, reversed. 
Theodore Golden, J. Bruce Fratis and Julius M. Keller 
for Appellants. 
James F. Galliano, C. Paul Paduck, Henry Teichert, Ger· 
aId P. Martin, Clark & Heafey, Edwin A. Heafey, Augustin 
Donovan and Louis B. De A vila for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-This action was brought to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiffs Dorsey and 
Anderson in an automobile accident. They sought recovery 
against Vincent Barba as operator, and Catherine Barba as 
registered owner, of the car which collided with the one in 
which they were riding. The jury returned verdicts against 
Vincent but in favor of Catherine, and judgment was entered 
accordingly. Thereafter, pursuant to a conditional order 
made on plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, the court, with 
Vincent's consent, modified the judgment against him by 
increasing the amount of damages awarded. Plaintiffs, who 
did not consent to the increase, have appealed from the modi-
fied judgment against Vincent and from the judgment in 
favor of Catherine. 
LIABILITY OF CATHERINE 
The automobile, which was purchased with community 
funds, was registered in Catherine's name alone, and she 
testified that Vincent "had it put in my name so that I 
would feel that half of it belonged to me and the other half 
belonged to him." Defendants separated, and a property 
settlement agreement was entered into by which Catherine 
transferred "all of her right, title, and interest" in the car 
to Vincent. The agreement was approved by an interlocutory 
decree of divorce signed about three months prior to the acci-
dent. Before the separation Vincent drove the car to and 
from work and used it whenever he desired, and it was in his 
possession when the agreement was made. Tl1e car was never 
J 
.) 
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driven by Catherint', and she testified that she allowed Vincent 
to keep it after the separation, that she "presumed he was 
using it," and that she did not ask him to return it or tell him 
he could not drive it. Catherine did not endorse the owner· 
ship certificate until some months after the accident, and she 
did not give the Department of Motor Vehlcles any notice 
of the intended transfer as provided by statute. (See Veh. 
Code, §§ 176, 177, 178, 186.) 
[1] Section 402 of the Vehicle Code, as amended in 1943, 
imputes to the owner of an automobile liability for the negli. 
gence of a person operating the vehicle with the owner's 
express or implied permission. In the absence of compliance 
with Vehicle Code, sections 178 and 186, a purported transfer 
of an automobile is ineffective to relieve an owner of the 
liability imposed under section 402. (See Weinberg v. White· 
bone, 87 Cal.App.2d 319 [196 P.2d 963] ; Stewart v. Norsigian, 
64 Cal.App.2d 540 [149 P.2d 46, 150 P.2d 554] ; LepZatv. 
Baley Wiles Auto Sales, 62 Cal.App.2d 628 [145 P.2d 350] ; 
Bunch v. Kin,2 Cal.App.2d 81 [37 P.2d 744] ; see, also, Votaw 
v. Farmers A. 1nter·1m. Exch., 15 Ca1.2d 24 t97 P.2d 958, 
126 A.L.R. 538J.) Catherine does not dispute this rule but 
contends that it is inapplicable to her because she had only 
a community interest in the car and never was an owner within 
the meaning of that section. She relies on section 66 of the 
Vehicle Code, which defines an owner as "a person having 
all the incidents of ownership," and argues that since the 
exclusive management and control of community personal I 
property is given to the husband by section 172 of the Civil 
Code, she did not have all of the rights of an owner in the car. 
[2] It is clear, however, that a person may be liable as 
an owner under section 402 \.lven though he does not have "all 
the incidents of ownership. " That section provides that every 
otoner of a motor vehicle is liable for imputed negligence 
except conditional vendors, their assignees, and chattel mort· 
gagees, when those persons are out of possession. The express 
mention of these exceptions indicates that the framers of sec· 
tion 402 did not intend to incorporate the definition of owner 
found in section 66. If the intent had been to limit liability 
to those having "all the incidents of ownership," it would 
not have been necessary to expressly exempt conditional 
vendors and chattel mortgagees, who, of course, do not possess 
all the rights of ownership. [3] Catherine, as sole registered 
38 C.2d-II 
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ownrr of t11r automobilr, obviously is included in the term 
"every owner," and since she is not within the exceptions she I 
can avoid liability only by showing she did ...... not actually 
eonsent or had no power to consent to Vincent's use of the 
car. 
'l'here can be no question that at the time of the accident 
Vincent was driving the car with Catherine's permission, but 
she contends that any consent she may have given was ineffec-
tive because she lacked power to give her husband permission 
to use the car since he had the right of management and control 
under section 172 of the Civil Code. In support of her posi-
tion Catherine relies upon Pacific Tel .. ~ Tel. Co. v. Wellman, 
98 Cal.App.2d 151 [219 P.2d 506], where the car involved in 
the accident was registered in the names of both Mr. and Mrs. 
WeUman. The court held that the car must be presumed to be 
community property and that for the purposes of section 402 
the negligence of Mr. Wellman in operating the car could not 
be imputed to his wife because she lacked power to consent to 
his use of it. (Cf. Cox v. Kaufman, 77 Cal.App.2d 449 [175 
P.2d 260], where the husband was the sole registered owner.) 
There is also language in Wilcox v. Berry, 32 Ca1.2d 189, 
191-192 [195 P.2d 414], and Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal. 
App.2d 957, 963, 965 [212 P.2d 246], indicating that when a 
car is registered in the names of both husband and wife, she 
may show that she had only a community interest and there-
fore had no power to give her husband consent to operate the 
car. 
[4] The foregoing cases may be distinguished, however, 
because none of them involved the situation here present 
where the car was registered in the wife's name alone and 
she in fact consented to her husband's use and operation of it. 
Under these circumstances, the wife should not be permitted 
to claim that she was without power to give such consent. 
[5] The requirements for registration were enacted· in the 
interests of public welfare, and one of the purposes for the 
legislation is to afford identification of vehicles and persons 
responsible in cases of accident and injury. (See Henry v. 
General Forming, Ltd., 33Ca1.2d 223, 227 [200 P.2d 785].) 
Where the registration shows the names of both husband and 
wife, their identity is disclosed as contemplated by the statute, 
and, if an accident occurs while the husband is driving, there 
may be some justification for permitting the wife to explain 
and amplify the record by showing the true status of her 
ownership. On the other hand, where, as here, the registration 
) 
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is in the wife's name. alone with her. knowledge, . and she in 
fact gives her husband implied or express permission to use the 
car, the statutory purpose would be defeated if she were 
permitted to contradict the record by showing that, instead of 
being the sole owner, she had merely a community property 
interest and no power to give permission.1 
It appears from the foregoing that the r(>cord estab-
lishes as a matter of law that Catherine was liable, to the 
extent provided by section 402, for any injuries to plaintiffs 
resulting from negligent operation of the car by Vincent. 
Since the jury determined that plaintiffs' injuries were the 
proximate result of Vincent's negligence, it could not properly 
have found for Catherine, and the judgment in her favor 
must therefore be reversed. 
PROPRIETY OF ORDER INCREASING AWARDS 
The verdicts against Vincent apparently made no allow-
ance for damages for pain and disfigurement suffered by 
plaintiffs since the amounts awarded were insufficient to cover 
medical expenses and loss of earnings. Plaintiffs' motion 
for new trial was denied on condition that Vincent consent 
to a modification of the judgment increasing each award in an 
amount fixed by the court. The figures arrived at exceeded 
the special damages proved and apparently included some 
compensation for pain and disfigurement. Vincent agreed to 
the increases, but plaintiffs' assent was not required or given. 
The primary question concerns the propriety of the court's 
action in assessing damages without plaintiffs' consent. 
Plaintiffs contend that the amounts fixed by the court are 
inadequate and that, since the damages are contested and 
uncertain, the act of the court in increasing the jury's award 
without their consent constitutes a denial of their right to a 
jury trial in violation of article I, section 7, of the California 
Constitution which provides that the "right of trial by jury 
shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate." [6] This sec-
tion guarantees the right of jury trial as it existed at common 
law when the Constitution was adopted in 1849. (People v. 
Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133 [263 P. 226] ; People v. Martin, 188 
Cal. 281, 285-286 l205 P. 121, 21 A.L.R. 1399]; Southern 
'For eases establishing the right of an injured party to proceed agaiust 
an owner other than the registered owner, see Ferroni v. Pacific Finance 
Corp., 21 Cal.2d 773, 778 [135 P.2d 569]; Logan v. Serpa, 91 CIlI.App.2d 
818, 822 f206 P.2d 70]; McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal.App.2d ;'46, 549-550 
[109 P.2d 358]. 
) 
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Pac. Land Co. v. Dickerson, 188 Cal. 113, 117·118 [204 P. 576] j 
Cline v. Superior Cotlrt, 184 Cal. 331, 339 [193 P. 929] j 
itlartin v. S·uperior Court. 176 Cal. 289, 292·294 [168 P. 135, 
hR.A. 1918B 313] ; sl.'e Estate of Baillbri~ge, 169 Cal. 166, 
167 [146 P. 427] ; Ingraham v. Weidler, 139 Cal. 588, 589· 
590 [73 P. 415].) At that time, apparently, there was no 
recognized common law practice allowing the court to increase 
a jury's award in a case involving unliquidated damages. 
(See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476482 [55 S.Ct. 296, 
297·299, 79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R. 1150] ; Mayne's Treatise on 
Damages [2d ed., 1856] pp. 303-305, [9th ed. 1919] pp. 571, 
580 j Sedgwick, Treatise on Damages [1847] pp. 19, 21, foot· 
note p. 582, cf. [4th ed. 1868] pp.710-717.) 
[7] The constitutional guarantee does not require adber· 
ence to the letter of common law practice, and new proce· 
dures better. suited to the efficient administration of justice 
may be substituted if tbere is no impairment of the substan-
tial features of a jury trial. (People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. . 
470, 476 [268P. 909, 270 P. 1117].) [8] An essential ele- i 
ment of sucb a trial, however, is that issues of fact shall be de-
cided by a jury, and the assessment of damages is ordinarily 
a question of fact. The jury as a fact-finding body occupies 
so firm and important a place in our system of jurisprudence ' 
that any interference with its function in this respect must 
be examined with the utmost care. 
There is a conflict of authority as to the extent of a court's 
power to increase the amount of an inadequate award over 
plaintiffs' objection. Some .iurisdictions do not permit the 
exercise of sucb a power. (Lemon v. Campbell, 136 Pa. Super. 
370 [7 A.2d 643], citing BI'adwell v. Pittsburgh <t W. E. P. 
R. Co. 139 Pa. 404 [20 A. 1046] ; see Watt v. Watt, L. R. 
[1905], A.C. 115, 119-121.) Some allow it where damages 
are liquidated or can be ascertained by a fixed standard. 
(R1ldnick v. Jacobs, 9 W.W.Harr. (Del.) 169 [197 A. 381, 
:)83, 384, discussing Massachusetts and Michigan decisions; 
Kram~ Y. American Bakeries Co., 231 Ala. 278 [164 So. 565, 
5701.) Other jurisdictions apparently allow the court to assess 
increased damages as a condition to denying a new trial with-
out regard to whether damages are liquidated or unliquidated. 
(See }Iarkota v. Ea.d Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio 546 [97 N.E. 
2d 13, 18-19] .)2 Tbe Wisconsin rule permits a court to in-
'Numerous cases contain broad statemt'nts recognizing the practice 
but invoh'e procedural and factual situations distinguishable ffom the 
one before us. Bee, for example, 8ecreto v. Carlander, 35 Cal.App.2d 
,/ 
l 
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creasp an award over plaintiffs' objection if defendant con-
sents to pay the largest amount which a jury could assess 
under the proof. (See Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 [214 
N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771].) 
[9] The leading authority on the subject is Dimick v. 
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 [55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R. 
1150] which held that a federal court could not increase a 
jury's award without the consent of both parties. The de-
cision points out that the practice was not recognized gen-
erally at common law, and that an attempt by the court 
to fix damages over plaintiff's objection constitutes a vio-
lation of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution which provides that "the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, 
than according to the rules of the common law." State 
. courts, of course, are not bound by the Seventh Amend-
ment (Pea1's01l v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 [24 L.Ed. 436] ; 
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 [23 L.Ed. 678], and it 
is true that there is some difference in language between that 
amendment and the parallel provision of the California Con-
stitution.s The reasoning of the Dimick case, however, is 
applicable here since both the state and federal Consti-
tutions adopted the existing rules of common law with re-
gard to trial by jury, and the variation in language does not 
warrant a different interpretation of the state Constitution. 
361,364 [95 P.2d 476), Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67 [224 P. ;;73, 
574], and Gaffney v. lllingsworth, 90 N.J.R. 490 [101 A. 243 at 243) 
[defendant refuses to assent to increase and appeals from order granting 
new trial, claiming court without power to make new trial order eon· 
ditional]; Esposito v. Lazar, 2 N.J. 257 [66 A.2d 172, 173], [defend-
ant appeals from order granting new trial on issue of damages alone, 
claiming verdict indicated compromise--see, also, Elvin V. Public Ser-
1:ice Coordinated Transp., 4 N.J.Super. 491 [67 A.2d 889, 890]; 
Blackmore v. Brennan, 43 Cal.App.2d 280, 289 [110 P.2d 723] [defend-
ant, appealing from modified judgment, waived right to jury trial by 
consenting to increased award]; &da·mson v. CO·lmly of Los .d.ngeie&, 
ii2 Cal.App. 125, 131 [198 P. 52) [collateral nttn<:k on modified final 
judgment in condemnation proceeding in which county had consented 
to inQreased award. Damages certain and computable.] 
Minnesota and New Hampshire have noted the question of interference 
with plaintiff's right to jury trial, hut have not pa8sed upon it. (Ol.~on 
v. Chri~tiansen, 230 Minn. 1!18 [41 N.W.2d 248-249]; Hackett v. 
Boston 4" M. R. R., 89 N.H. :;14 [6 A.2d 139, 140, 142).) 
"A.rticle I, section 7, of the California Constitution provides merely 
that the right of trial by jury "shall be secured to all and remain 
inviolate," and it does not contain the further language that "no fact 
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined ••. than accordinr to 
the rule! of the common law." 
) 
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It is g'('nera lIy r('('ogll iz('d that a COllrt may not in-
crease an inH<ieqllate award in It ease involving contested and 
unliquidated damages without the defendant's consent. (See 
note 53 A.L.R. 783; 95 A.L.R. 1165; cf. discussion of the 
Wisconsin practice in Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 [214 
N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771}.) It would seem to follow, logi-
cally, that the plaintiff's consent is also necessary. The assess-
ment of damages by a court where they are speculative and 
uncertain constitutes more than a technical invasion of the 
plaintiff's right to a jury determination of the issue. De-
spite the fact that he has apparently benefited by the in-
crease, the plaintiff has actually been injured if, under the 
evidence, he could have obtained a still larger award from 
a second jury. In the present case, for example, the evi-
dence would sustain recovery for pain and disfigurement 
well in excess of the amounts assessed by the court. 
In support of the practice of denying a new trial over 
the plaintiffs' objection on condition that defendant con-
sent to pay an increased amount, it has been said that the 
constitutional guarantee is satisfied when the plaintiff has 
had one jury trial and that the court's exercise of its power 
to grant or deny new trials will not be disturbed in the ab~ 
sence of an abuse of discretion. (See dissenting opinion 
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. at 492-498, 55 8.Ct. at 303-305.) 
[10] However, it is not the mere form of a jury trial to 
which one is entitled under the Constitution, 'but the funda-
mental right to have a jury determination of a question of 
fact. [11] It is, of course, clear that there has been no 
denial of such' right if a verdict is set aside and motion for 
new trial granted. (Estate of Bainbridge, 169 Cal. 166 (146 
P. 427} ; Ingra.ham v. Weidler, 139 Cal. 588 [73 P. 415].) 
[12] But it does not follow that, in lieu of ordering a new 
trial, the court may itself assess damages on conflicting or i 
uncertain evidence and modify the judgment with the assent 
of only one party. Neither can such procedure be justified 
as a proper exercise of the court's authority to prescribe 
terms in granting or denying motions for new trials. [13] A 
court may not impose conditions which impair the right of 
either party to a reassessment of damages by the jury where 
the first verdict was inadequate, and the defendant's waiver 
of his right to jury trial by consenting to modification of 
the judgment cannot be treated as binding on the plaintiff. 
[14] It is true that a court has power to require reduc-
tion of a jury's award over the defendant's objection as a 
--~) 
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condition to denying his motion for a new trial in cases 
where damages are uncertain and speculative. (Draper v. 
Hellman Commercial T. & S. Bank, 203 Cal. 26, 42-43 [263 
P. 240] ; M07'ris v. Standard Oil Co., 192 Cal. 343 [219 P. 
'""'998, 30 A.L.R. 1103] ; Zibbell v. SOttthern Pac. Co., 160 Cal. 
237,254 [116 P. 513].) There is considerable doubt whether 
this power was recognized at common law,· but, as stated 
by this court in 1893, the practice is "too firmly established 
in this state by a long line of decisions to be now ques-
tioned." (Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13, 17, 18 
[32 P. 646].) There may be no real distinction between 
the powers to increase and decrease an award of damages, 
but it does not follow that because the practice. of remitting 
damages over the defendant's objection haS been approved 
through what appears to have been a misconception of com-
mon law procedure, we must now allow the court to assess 
increased damages over the plaintiff's objection, a practice 
which has even less basis in the common law. Like the 
United States Supreme Court. in the Dimick case, we are 
reluctant to extend the precedent of the remittitur cases, 
. by analogy or otherwise, to the present situation, since it 
would result in impairment of the right to jury trial. 
Arguments to the effect that courts should be permitted 
to increase awards without the plaintiff's consent because 
such procedure is more expeditious and would constitute 
an improvement over established practice might be persuasive 
if addressed to the people in support of a constitutional 
amendment, but they are not appropriate here. 
The judgment is reversed as to both defendants. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J:, Carter, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree that 
the modified judgment should be reversed as to Vincent; I 
would, however, affirm the judgment as to Catherine. She 
lacked the power to for:fJid Vincent's use of the car and, ' . 
hence, as a matter of law she could not in any legally ma- ! 
terial sense consent to his use of it. (See Krum v. Malloy 
'It was apparently taken for granted in this st.ate. as it was in the 
early federal eourts. that the practice was established at common law. 
(See Dimick v. 8chiedt, 293 U.S. 474. 482·484 [55 S.Ct. 296, 299-300, 
79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R. 1150]; Benedict v. CozzefUI (18.i4), 4 Cal. 381; 
see, however, Payne v. Pacific Mail SteamRhi{' Co. (1850), 1 Cal. 33, 
36·37 and George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 364-365.) 
) 
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(1943), 22 Cal.2d 132, 135 [137 P.2d 18] ; People v. Forbath 
(1935),5 Cal.App.2d Supp. 767,769 [42 P.2d 108].) . 
TRAYNOR, J., concurring and dissenting.-For the rea-
sons stated in the majority opinion, I agree that the judg-
ment in favor of Catherine Barba should be reversed. I 
dissent, however, from the holding that the courts of this 
state do not have the power of additur.l 
I 
It is incongruous that plaintiffs should base their appeal 
upon the ground that they have been denied a constitutional 
right to jury trial. Although they had a jury trial, they 
do not want a judgment entered on the jury verdict. They 
attack that verdict and ask the court to rescue them from 
it by granting a new trial before another jury. The right 
to a jury trial, however, does not include the right to a 
new trial. 
Plaintiffs' erroneous reliance upon the constitutional guar-
antee' results from a failure to recognize the dual character 
of the right to jury trial. Section 7 of article I of the Cali-
fornia Constitution operates at the time of trial to require I 
submission of certain issues to the jury. Once a verdict' 
has been returned, however, the effect of the constitutional 
provision is to prohibit improper interference with the jury's 
decision. This secondary effect of the constitutional right 
is well illustrated by the reluctance of the English common 
law judges to grant new trials in tort cases on the. grounds 
of excessive or inadequate damages. At the time of the 
American Revolution,2 the jury's determination of the amount 
of damages in contract actions and in certain tort actions 
1, I Additur," sometimes ealled "inereseitur," is used herein to describe 
an order by which a plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of 
inadequate damages is denied on the condition that the defendant eonsent 
to a speeified inerease of the award. "Remittitur" is used to deseribp 
an order by which a defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground 
of excessive damages is denied on the condition that tIle plaintiff consent 
to a specified reduction of thc award. 
"With the inclusion of jury trial pro\'isiolls in the early state and 
federal Constitutions (see 35 C.J. 147, t 12), the concept of jury trial 
in this country became fixed and has not been affected by subsequent 
changes in English law. It is this American concept of jury trial, based 
on the English jury system of Revolutionary times, that was adopted 
in California in 1849. (See Koppik'U8 V. State Capitol CommrB., 16 Cal. 
248, 253, 254; People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 475 [268 P. 909, 270 
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involving property was subject to judicial supervision through 
the granting of nc\v trials; in tort actions involving interests 
in personality, however, the courts rarely:i interfered with 
the amount of the jury's verdict. (Wil/m'd v. Berkeley, 1 
Burr. 669, 97 Eng.Rep. 472 [K.B. 1758] ; Sharpe v. Brice, 
2 Bl.W.942, 96 Eng.Rep. 557 [C.P. 1774]; Beardmore v. 
Carrington, 2 Wils.K.B. 244, 248, 95 Eng.Rep. 790, 792 
[C.P. 1764] ; see Buller, J., on Nisi Prius [1785 ed.], p. 327; 
Sedgwick on Damages [9th ed. 1913], pp. 688.689; Mayne , 
on Damages [11th ed. 1946), pp. 632·636; McCormick on . 
Damages, pp. 26.27; Washington, Damages in Contract at 
Common Lato, 47 L.Q.Rev. 345, 364.) Moreover, the judges 
expressly recognized that the reason for their refusal to 
grant new trials in such cases was the fact that the deter· 
mination of the amount of damages was within the exclusive 
province of the jury. Thus, in 1764, in a case involving 
trespass and false imprisonment, the Court of Common Pleas 
reviewed the earlier decisionS and, in a unanimous opinion, 
said: "Weare now come to the case in 1 Stra. 691, Cham. 
bers v. Robinson, which seems to be the only case where 
ever a new trial was granted merely for the excessiveness . 
of damages only: we are not satisfied with the reason given. 
in that case, and think it of no weight, and want to know 
the facts upon which the Court could pronounce the dam· 
ages to be excessive. The principle on which it was granted, I 
mentioned in Strange, was to give the defendant a chance • 
of another jury: this is a very bad reason; for if it was ; 
not, it would be a reason for a third and fourth trial, and I 
would be digging up the constitution by the roots; and there· ! 
fore we are free to say this case is not law ; and that there 
is not one single case (that is law) in all the books to be I 
found, where the Court has granted a new trial for excessive I 
damages in actions for torts. . • . We desire to be under •. 
stood that this Court does not say, or lay down any rule' 
that there never can happen a case of such excessive dam· 
agt's in tort where the Court may not grant a new trial; . 
but in that case the damages must be monstrous and enor· 
mous indeed, and such as all mankind must be ready to . 
--rort easel of the 17th and early 18th eentu~8I in which new trials 
were granted for exC!.essive damages appear to have involved also actual 
miaeonduet of the jury. (See Wood v. GitutOtl, Style 466, 82 Eng.Rep. 
867 [U.B. 1655); BOB v. Haw"keB, 1 Lev. 97, 83 Eng.Rer' 316 [K.B. 
1663]; ..t,h v . ..t,h, Comb. 357, 90 Eng.Rep. 526 [K.B. 1697 ; Beardmore 
v. CGfTi"gtOtl, 2 Wils.K.B. 244, 249, 95 EnIf.BeP. 790, 793 C.P. 1764].) 
) 
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l'xclaim against, at first blush." (Beardmore v. Carrington, 
------:r\Vils.K.B. 244, 249, 95 Eng.Rep. 790, 793.) 4 
Unwillingness to interfere with the jury's decision was like-
wise a controlling consideration in the first California case , 
to discuss the constitutional function of the jury with re- I 
spect to the assessment of damages. In Payne v. Pacific Mail 
S. S. Co., 1 Cal. 33, a tort action decided in 1850, the evi-
dence on the issue of damages was conflicting, and the jury 
returned a verdict for $1,000. The trial court ordered a 
new trial unless the plaintiff consented to a remittitur of 
$400, but the plaintiff refused and appealed from the order 
granting a new trial. In unanimously reversing the action 
of the trial judge, this court said: "Courts with great re-
luctance ever interfere with the finding of a jury in an action 
for unliquidated damages for reason that the damages are ! 
excessive, and a court ought never to set aside a verdict 
for such a cause, unless, beyond doubt, the verdict be un-
just and oppressive, obtained through some undue advantage, 
mistake, or in violation of law, as upon questions so pecu-
liarly pertaining to the powers and investigation of the 
jury, it ought to be presumed that the verdict of the jury 
is correct. . . . The right of trial by jury in civil as well 
as criminal cases, being secured by the Bill of Rights, and 
believing as we do, that it is the duty of this court to re-
move every obstacle in the way of a free exercise of its right, 
and that it should not be interfered with on the part of 
the courts, except for the reasons above alluded to, and that 
in the end, however just it may have appeared to the court 
below to set aside this verdict, great abuse, if not the de-
struction of this right, would ensue, we are of the opinion 
that the order of the court of First Instance, granting a new 
trial, should be reversed." ( 1 Cal. 33, 36-37.) 
The following year, the Payne case was expressly approved 
in George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365, which was decided under 
circumstances even more directly analogous to the present 
'After the American Revolution, dicta continued to appear to the 
effect that new trials for excessive damages would be granted in casel 
of torts against the person under appropriate circumstances; by the 
end of the 18th century the Court of King's Bench had acted upon this 
doctrine. (Jones v. Sparrow, 5 T.R. 257, 101 Eng.Rep. 144 [K.B. 1793]; 
cf. Duberly v. Gunning, 4 T.R. 651, 100 Eng.Rep. 1226 [K.B. 1792].) 
Until the middle of the 19th century, however, the English courts re-
fused to grant new trials in such cases on the ground of inadequate 
damages. (See Phillips v. London 4' 8. W. By., 5 Q.B.D. 78 [1879]; 
Manton v. Bales, 1 C.B. 444. 135 Eng.Rep. 613 [1845]; 0/ . .4rmytage v. 
HaltJy, 4 Q.B. 917, 918, 114 Eng.Rep. 1143, 1143 [1843].) 
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appeal. The-plaintiff was awarded $1,000 by the jury, but 
the trial court ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff should 
consent to a remission of $500. This time the plaintiff 
consented, and the defendants appealed. In affirming the 
judgment, the court said: "It can scarcely be just ground 
of complaint on the part of appellants that the judgment 
of the court stands for but one-half the amount, for which 
the verdict of the jury was rendered. The respondent, if ! 
he had not acquiesced in the action of the court below by . 
filing his remittitur, might, with more reason, have sought 
the intervention of this court to sustain the finding of the 
jury .... " (1 Cal. 363, 365.) 
These early English and California cases show clearly 
that when the constitutional right to jury trial was estab-
lished it was regarded as a protection to parties relying upon 
a verdict. Not until today has this court undertaken to 
extend that protection to parties who attack a verdict. It 
is true that new trials because of excessive or inadequate 
damages are more frequently granted now than a century 
ago (el.Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 122-129), but it 
is also true that this modern practice constitutes a limita-
tion upon the former powers of the jury. Whatever may 
be the basis of a party's right to a new trial on the ground 
of inadequate damages, it is obvious that such relief is granted 
in spite of, rather than because of, the constitutional right 
of trial by jury. 
IT 
In an attempt to overcome the fact that plaintiffs have 
already had their jury trial, it is contended that there has 
been thus far only a formal compliance with the constitu- ! 
tional requirement; it is said that plaintiffs have yet to be 
accorded the substance of the right to jury trial-"the fun-
damental right to have a jury determination of a question 
of fact." Unquestionably, the praetical effect· of additur 
is to give plaintiffs a judgment based, as to amount, upon 
a finding made by the trial judge. Moreover, the mere fact 
that plaintiffs have benefited from the disagreement between 
judge and jury is not of itself a sufficient answer to the claim 
that the judge had no authority to make such a finding. 
Under appropriate circumstances, judges constitutionally 
may, and constantly do, determine fact issues. The broad 
scope of this fact-finding activity refutes the contention that 
the framers of the Constitution regarded the jury as the 
) 
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exclusive fact tribunal. Thus, in a common law action 
tried before a jury, the trial judge makes innumerable fact 
decisions in admitting and excluding eviderice, in determin-
ing the court's jurisdiction, in passing on pleadings, and in 
interpreting documents. (Fairbank v. Hughson, 58 Cal. 314, 
315; Vallejo & Northern R. 00. v. Reed Orchard 00., 169 Cal. 
545, 575 [147 P. 238] ; United States v. Ootter, 60 F.2d 689, 
691; People v. Hillman, 246 N.Y. 467, 472-474 [159 N.E. 
400] ; State v. White, 70 Vt. 225, 228 [39 A. 1085]; Durr , 
v. State, 175 Miss. 797, 808 [168 So. 65] ; see 9 Wigmore on 
Evidence, [3d ed.], pp. 499-530, §§ 2549-2559; Thayer, Pre-
liminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 185,202,203,249.) These 
decisions may even involve the same fact issues that, for 
other purposes, are placed before the jury and may be of 
equal importance to the outcome of the case. (See, for ex-
ample, Peat's Case, 2 Lewin 288, 168 Eng.Rep. 1157, and 
note.) Moreover, in equity, admiralty, probate, divorce, bank-
ruptcy, and an ever-growing number of administrative cases, 
there is no constitutional right to a jury at all-fact ques-
tions may constitutionally be decided by the judge or ad-
ministrative body alone. 
It is apparent that these many instances of judicial fact-
finding cannot be reconciled with what plaintiffs claim is the 
underlying principle of jury trial. In reality the explana-
tion of the right to jury trial is neither logical nor theo-
retical-it is historical. II The jury system developed in Eng-
land over a period of centuries, and during that develop-
ment many fundamental changes took place; at no time was 
the system wholly consistent within itself. The framers of 
the Constitution wisely refrained from attempting to ration-
alize into a single principle the conflicting rules relating to 
juries. Their object was not to perfect the jury system but 
to perpetuate it, and the right they established was there-
fore a limited one-the right to have a jury trial of cer-
tain questions of fact under certain circumstances. Expan-
"It is sometimes said that the constitutional guarantee was intended 
primarily to limit the power of judges. This view of the jury system 
as essentially a protection against judicial officials does not conflict with 
additur. The jury by its verdict has already provided the contemplated 
protection. So fnr as the present plaintiffs are concerned, the limits 
fixed by the jury have not been violated, for the judge has awarded 
plaintiffs more than did the jury. Any objection that the judge has 
gone beyond the verdict in the other direction is removed by defendant's 
consent. 
) 
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sion and impro\'emellt were left to statute and to consti-
tutioual alllendment.6 
In deciding the issue of constitutionality, therefore, we must 
be governed by an historical standard. At the time of the 
American Revolution, would plaintiffs have had the right to 
a reassessment of dti.mages by a second jury, They would 
have had no such right simply because, as has been seen, the 
first jury's determination of the amount of damages was 
c.onclusive. The reexamination of the damages issue follow-
ing an inadequate verdict in cases of torts against the per-
son is a modern development unknown to the common law. 
Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the English 
judges of the late 18th century would have utilized the ad-
ditur device, had they been willing to give plaintiffs' motion 
any consideration at all. 
It must be borne in mind that plaintiffs are in this court 
on an appeal from the trial court's ruling on their motion 
for a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict. Two of the well-established 
priuciples governing the disposition of such motions are of 
particular importance. 
1. The granting of new trials on the ground of the in-
sufficiency of the evidence is discretionary with the court. T 
Such new trials developed in the 17th century after pun-
ishment of jurors and the harsh remedy of attaint had fallen 
into disuse. (1 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3d ed. 
p. 225; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 169, 
172.) Equity had undertaken to relieve against unjust ver-
dicts, and, in seeking to protect their jurisdiction from the 
encroachment of the chancellor, the common law courts them-
selves began to set aside verdicts that were inequitable. 
(Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 394-395, 97 Eng.Rep. 365, 
-This responsibility has nut been ignored. For example: the require· 
ment of a unanimous verdiet bas been remOl'ed in eivil eases (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § j); the broad prineiples of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibit exclusion of Negroes from jury serviee (see NeGl v. DeZGwGre, 
103 U.S. 370, 38.1 [26 L.Ed. 567.1; CtJ88eLZ V. XeIUI8, 339 U.S. 282 [70 
S.Ot. 629,94 L.Ed. 839]; ct. BGllGrd v. United 8tGt1l8, 329 U.S. 187, 193 
[67 S.Ot. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181] [women as jurors]; 157 A.L.R. 461): the 
right to jury trial has been extended to probate matters by statute. 
(Prob. Code, .371.) 
'The court'll discretion is more limited, of eourse, when a new trial 
ia $Ought on the ground of legal error eommitted by the trial judge. 
The eonstitutional guarantee may well inelude the right to a jury that 
bas not been misled by irregularities during the trial or by incorrect 
instruetions on the law. 
) 
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867; r; Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3d ed. p. 301; 
Washington. Dmnugl's in Contmct at Cominon Law, 47 L.Q. 
Rev. 345. 358.) There never developed an absolute right to a 
new trial; instead the considerations that govern the court's 
discretion have always been equitable in nature. Thus, a 
textbook published at the end of the colonial period states: 
"As the granting of a new trial is absolutely in the Breast 
of the Court, they will often govern their discretion by col- . 
lateral matters; and therefore will not grant a new trial in I 
hard actions, such. as case for negligently keeping his nre; 
nor where the equity of the cause is on the other side." 
(Buller, J., on Nisi Prius [1785 ed.], p. 326. See, also, 
3 Bl.Com. 392 [Jones ed. p. 2004] ; Wt'Zkinson v. Payne, 4 T.R. 
468, 100 Eng.Rep. 1123 [K.B. 1791]; and cases collected in r 
2 Salk. 644-653, 91 Eng.Rep. 543-556.) Judicial discretion in 
ruling on new trial motions has continued to this day. It is 
well settled in California that the trial court's decision on such 
a motion will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of 
a showing of an abuse of discretion. (WiUiams v. Field 
Transp. Co., 28 Cal.2d 696, 698 [171 P.2d 722] ; Mosekian v. 
Ginsberg, 122 Cal.App. 774, 780 [10 P.2d 525].) Even the 
statute that specifies the grounds for a new trial states only 
that it "may" be granted if one of those grounds is shown 
to exist. (Code Civ. Proc.§ 657.) 
By their motion for new trial, therefore, plaintiffs in ef-
fect appealed to the conscience of the court. They cannot 
complain that the court, viewing all the equities of the case, 
has selected a more expeditious and less costly method of 
remedying the alleged injustice of the verdict. The trial 
judge's solution is reasonable and equitable-plaintiffs are 
entitled to no more. 
2. New trial orders are frequently conditional. At com-
mon law a typical condition was that the moving party pay 
the costs of the first trial. (Brigkt v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 
97 Eng.Rep. 365; see, also, R'ice v. Gaskirie, 13 Cal. 53, 54.) 
According to Blackstone, the moving party might even be 
required to consent to a change in the rules of evidence at 
the second trial. (3 Bl.Com. 392 [Jones ed. p. 2005].) New 
trials have also been conditioned upon payment of the oppos-
ing party's counsel fees (see Brooks v. Sa'1/. Francisco ct N. P. 
R. Co., 110 Cal. 173, 174 [42 P. 570]) and upon consenting to 
go to trial at a particular term of court. (NeZsO'l/. v. DSl1MY, 
lQ2 F.2d 487, 491.) Similariy, new trials have been refused 
on condition that the opposing party remit excess damages 
) 
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(Hughes v. H carst Publications Inc., 79 Cal.App.2d 703, 
704 [180 P.2d 419]) and even on condition that certain land 
awarded by the verdict be excluded from the judgment. 
(Fry v. Stowers, 98 Va. 417, 421-423 [46 S.E. 482] ; see, also, 
Gillespie v. Jones, 47 Cal. 259, 264; Eaton v. Jones, 107 Cal. 
487, 491 [40 P. 798 J.) There is no impropriety, therefore, 
in the conditional nature of the new trial order now under 
review. If new trials can be granted on condition that a 
certain amount be paid by one party to another, why may 
they not be denied on the same condition' In each situa-
tion the court exeN:.ises a sound discretion in the interests 
of an equitable solution of the case. 
There are dicta in some of the common law cases to the 
effect that the verdict of a jury can be reexamined only by 
a second jury. (See, for example, Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 
390, 393, 97 Eng.R€p. 365, 366 [K.B. 1757].)8 It is clear, 
however, that in making such statements the judges had in 
. mind only the liability issue. On that issue there are but 
two possible verdicts, and the court can change the jury's 
decision only by making a directly contrary finding. In-
variably the party relying on the verdict would oppose such 
a change, and to protect that party it was held that any 
reexamination of the liability issue must be before another 
jury. An entirely different situation is presented, however, 
by a motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive or 
inadequate damages--a situation not considered by the com-
mon law judges. In such a case the court is not limited 
to a complete reversal of the jury's determination and may 
decide to make only a modification. The party relying on 
the verdict may prefer that modification to the expense and 
delay of a new trial; his consent removes the necessity for 
a second jury. 
III 
Although few courts have ruled directly on additur, re-
mittitur has been accepted in almost all states where the 
question has arisen. (See 53 A.L.R. 783-792; 95 A.L.R. 1166-
1168.) Remittitur has been allowed in California for over 
100 years. (George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365; Hughes v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 79 Cal.App.2d 703, 704 [180 P.2d 419].) 
The majority opinion concedes that "There may be no real 
"Justice Story made a similar statement in United State. v. Wonson, 
1 Gall. 5 [28 Fed.Cas. 745, 750), but he approved remittitur in Blunt 
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distinction" behveen additur and remittitur but finds justi-
fication for remittitur in the fact that prior decisions have 
approved it-"through what appears to have been a mis-
conception of common law. procedure." I am not opposed 
to the continuation of remittitur, for I believe it to be con-
stitutional. I do oppose, however, the argument that, al-
though remittitur and additur are identical in legal prin-
ciple. the former may be held valid and the latter invalid. 
The decisions approving remittitur are controlling in any 
fact situation that is not materially different, and they are 
therefore controlling here. The first victim of an automo-
bile accident to sue for damages was not turned out of court 
merely because the closest precedents involved horse-drawn 
carriages. 
To hold remittitur constitutional and additur unconstitu-
tional is not only illogical-it is unfair. In the present case 
plaintiffs are being given a new trial as a matter of right, 
and yet, if the second jury allows excessive damages, the 
trial judge, with plaintiffs' consent, can select a lesser amount 
and require defendant to pay it. I doubt whether such a 
procedure accords a defendant the equal protection of the 
laws. 
There is nothing unusual in the fact that early cases per-
mitting remittitur are to be found whereas additur precedents 
are both few and recent. Courts undertook to grant new 
trials for excessive damages many years before similar action 
was taken on the ground of inadequacy. (See McCormick on 
Damages, pp. 72-73 ; Washington, Damage, in Oontract at 
Oommon Law, 47 L.Q.Rev. 345, 365, n. 7; 46 C.J. 207-213, 
§§ 152-154.)9 The issue of additur, therefore, was not pre-
sented until modern times. Nevertheless, additur is an equally 
logical step in the growth of the law relating to unliquidated 
damages.JO When the party rel~ing on a verdict consents' 
to a modification by the court, whether that modification be 
a reduction or an increase, the necessary constitutional pro-
tection has been provided. 
~ew triala based on inadequacy are still prohibited by statute in 
some states. (See 66 C.J.S. 258, ~ 77d.) 
1. A similar development has been the practice of limiting new trials 
to the damages issue in appropriate cases. The contention that thil 
procedure is unconstitutional (because it was unknown to the common 
law and results in presenting to the second jury an incomplete version 
of the case) has been rejected. (GGlO".' Product, Co. v. C1uJmpUft 
Befift'ft,Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-499 [51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188J.) 
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Tn my opinion, therefore, it was not a misconception of 
common law procedure that prompted Justice Story to allow 
remittitur in 1822. (Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 102 [3 Fed.Cas. 
760].) His decision and the unanimous decision of this court 
in 1851 (George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365) show that at the 
time our Constitution was adopted remittitur was not rt'garded 
as a violation of the right to jury trial. I do not believe 
that these early judges were unaware of the purposes of the 
Bill of Rights and the common law principles governing the 
granting of new trials. 
The remittitur cases attest not only the constitutionality 
of additur but its practical value as well. Remittitur became 
an established rule of the law of damages as soon as the 
practice of setting aside excerive verdicts became general. l1 
It has been utilized in innumerable cases to avoid, for both 
the parties and the courts, the expense and delay of repetitious 
litigation. In the field of inadequate verdicts, additur can be 
of similar value. 
IV 
The majority opinion relies upon Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 
·U.S. 474 [55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R. 1150], in 
which the United States Supreme Court held that additur 
"iolates the fedt'ral Constitution. That decision is not con-
trolling here, for the Seventh Amendment is not binding upon 
the California conrts. Moreover, there are pprsnasivp arllU-
ments for rejecting the reasoning upon which the Dimick 
case rests. 
"Once the opposition to new trials for excessive damages in eases ot 
torts against the person had been overcome, the Engli8h courts utilized 
remittitur until tbe dceision of the House of Lords in Watt v. Watt, 
r1905J A.C. 115. (See Belt v. Lawes, 12 Q.B.D. 356, 358; Htirry v. 
Watson, Tr. 27 G. 3, C.B., 4. T.R. 659, 100 Eng.Rep. 1230.) In tbiil 
country remittitur is npproximately as old as new trials for excessive 
damages; thus, ill ordering a remittitur in 1822 (Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 
] 02 r 3 Fccl.Cas. 7601), .1 ustice Story observed that such new trials 
had only rceently become recognized, and even for tbat statement he 
relied exclusively U(Jon dicta in English eases in wbieh new trials hnd 
actually been denied. In California remittitur was approved in 18.i] 
(George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365), only a year after this court bad 
reversed the granting of 1\ ne',. trial for excessive damages. (Payne v. 
Pacific Mail 8. 8. Co., 1 Cal. 33, 37.) Although medieval cases involving 
jury attaint are not dircetly in point, since the principles underlying 
attaints differed from those governing new trials, it is nevertheless 
significant that an attnint for excessive damages was barred if plaintiff 
remitted the excess. (Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 
47 L.Q.Rev. 34;), 34!l. citing: Y.B. P Hen. VI, f.2, pI. 5 /"1431J; Y.B. 
12 Edw. IV, f.;), pI. 13 [1473J; Y.B. 13 Edw. IV, f.l, pI. 3 [1474].) 
J 
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The Seventh Amendment provides: "In suits at common 
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no 
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law." The first part of the amendment is similar 
to section 7 of article I of the California Constitution, which 
reads: "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, 
and remain inviolate." As is pointed out in the majority 
opinion, the effect of this language is to guarantee the sub-
stance of the right to trial by jury as it existed at common 
law. The second part of the Seventh Amendment, however, 
is entirely different in spirit and effect, and carries the federal 
Constitution beyond the substance of the common law right. 
Thus, in 1830, the United States Supreme Court declared 
that the second clause was "substantial and independent" of 
the first. (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 433, 447 [78 
L.Ed. 732].) In view of this early interpretation, it is sig- I 
nificant that neither the Constitution of 1849 nor the present 
California Constitution adopted the second part of the federal 
guarantee. 
The restrictive character of the Seventh Amendment lan-
guage has more than once led the federal courts to follow 
anomalous rules in dealing with judicial supervision of juries. 
Thus, it has been held that a federal judge, sitting in a jury 
case, could direct a verdict when the evidence as a matter 
of law was conclusive, but could not enter judgment not-
withstanding the verdict after he had erroneously failed to 
direct the verdict and the jury had erroneously found for 
the opposing party. (SlOC1tm v. New York Life Ins. 00., 228 
U.S. 364, 399 [33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879].) The reason for 
this distinction was that, after a verdict has been returned. 
a federal court is limited by the second clause of the Seventh 
Amendment to the formal procedure of the common law. 
Since the California Constitution guarantees only the sub-
stance of jury trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
is available in this state in cases where directed verdicts are 
proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629; Estate of Baird, 198 Cal. 
490, 506 [246 P. 324].) 
It is apparent that in the Dimick case the problem of 
constitutional construction facing the United States Supreme 
Court was materially different from that presented here. 
(See 44 Yale L.Jour. 318. 324-325.) The court concluded that 
additur involves a reexamination of the damages issue after 
common 
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the jury has tried that question, and, since no common law 
precedent for the practice was found, it was held to be a 
prohibited innovation. The long-standing practice of remittitur 
in the federal courts was justified on the ground of a century 
of acceptance under the Constitution. 
Even under the narrow language of the Seventh Amend-
ment, the United States Supreme Court had great difficulty 
in reaching the conclusion that additur is unconstitutional. 
The decision in the Dimick case was by a bare majority of 
five Justices, and Justice Stone, with whom Chief Justice 
Hughes and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred, filed 
a well-reasoned dissenting opinion. The dissent emphasizes 
the broad discretion of the common law judges in ruling on 
new trial motions, the essential identity of additur and re-
mittitur, the dangers of too rigid a construction of constitu-
tional provisions, and "the generally recognized advantages 
of the practice as a means of securing substantial justice 
and bringing the litigation to a more speedy and economical 
conclusion than would be possible by a new trial to a 
jury .... " (293 U.S. 474, 490 [55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603, 
95 A.L.R. 1150].) 
{So F. No. 18226. In Bank. Feb. 5, 1952.] 
RICHARD CAFFREY, Respondent, v. B. A. TILTON, 
Appellant. 
[1] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu-Place of Performance.-Civ. 
Code, § 1489, declaring that in absence of express provision 
to contrary an offer of performance may be made at the option 
of the debtor wherever the person to whom the offer ought to 
be made can be found, does not have the effect ofa "special 
contract in writing" within the .meaning of Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 395, stating that the county in which a contractual obligation 
is incurred shall be deemed to be the county in which it is to 
be performed unless there is a special contract in writing to 
the contrary. 
[2] Id. - Actions Ex Contractu - Plac~ of Performance.-While 
Civ. Code, § 1489, relating to offer of performance, may be 
an implied provision of an agreement appointing plaintiff 
defendant's representative in a certain area on a commission -
[1] See Ca1.Jur., Venue, § 17; Am.Jur., Venue, § 19. 
ldcK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Venue, § 26. 
